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DEMOCRACY UNCAGED
OUR UNDEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTION: WHERE
THE CONSTITUTION GOES WRONG (AND HOW
WE THE PEOPLE CAN CORRECT IT). Sanford
Levinson.' Oxford University Press. 2006. Pp. ix + 233.
$28.00 (cloth).
Suzanna Sherry2
Sanford Levinson's latest book, like his previous work, is
charmingly written and delightfully quirky. Aimed primarily at
non-lawyers, it is meant to persuade readers that we ought to call
a constitutional convention to remedy what he calls the "hardwired" defects of the Constitution: defects that inhere in the very
structure of the constitutional fabric and that therefore cannot
be remedied through even the most creative interpretation (pp.
23, 29). The most important of these defects, according to Levinson, are the existence and operation of the Electoral College,
other problems surrounding the presidency, allocation of power
in the Senate, bicameralism and the resulting opportunity for political minorities to block popular legislation, and the nearimpossibility of amending the Constitution. Despite the light
tone of most of the book, Levinson is deadly serious: In the
course of writing the book, he says, his commitment to remedying our undemocratic, "abusive" Constitution "has moved far
from an academic project (in the pejorative sense)" (p. 172). He
therefore closes the book with suggestions on how to make a
constitutional convention a reality.
Unfortunately, as is often the case with heartfelt visionary
projects, his call for a convention suffers from two complementary flaws. He overstates the Constitution's defects and understates the risks of submitting it to a constitutional convention for
revision. Reading between the lines, we might fairly attribute
1. St. John Garwood Chair in Law, University of Texas School of Law.
2. Herman 0. Loewenstein Professor of Law, Vanderbilt University Law School. I
thank Lisa Bressman and Paul Edelman for helpful suggestions.
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these flaws to Levinson's underlying motivation: He is guided by
his objection to the maneuvers of the Bush administration and
his devotion to the governmental ideals of Thomas Jefferson. I
address each of his errors in turn.
Let us begin with the Electoral College, which Levinson
says "supplies the decisive and overriding reason for rejecting
the status quo and supporting a convention" (p. 82). The main
thrust of Levinson's critique of our "dreadful system of presidential selection" (p. 81) is that it gives an "indefensible advantage.., to low population states" (p. 89). According to Levinson, this undemocratic allocation of power causes a variety of
ills: (1) Presidents are frequently elected without winning a majority of the popular vote, and occasionally even when they come
in second in the popular vote; (2) Voters in states like New York
or Texas, which are reliably Democratic and Republican, respectively, might as well throw their votes away because they don't
matter; and (3) Presidential candidates ignore all but a few "battleground states."
Of course, most of these problems are not directly attributable to the Electoral College. The ability of a candidate to win
the White House with only a plurality of the popular vote is due
not to the Electoral College but to our "first-past-the-post"
method of determining winners. The other two problems derive
from the way that states allocate electors, which is not mandated
by the Constitution. States are free to choose how to allocate
their electors, and it is only because 48 states have chosen to allocate them on a winner-take-all basis that there exist "safe"
states and "battleground" states.3 If most states divided their
electors according to the percentages received by each candidate
in the state's popular vote, candidates would fight for every vote
in every state-and every vote would count. Alternatively, there
is now a movement among the large states to agree to allocate all
of their electors to whichever candidate wins the national popular vote, which would effectively eliminate all of the problems
associated with the Electoral College. And on a deeper level, it
is the domination of two-and only two-parties that allows the
Electoral Collee to function in the problematic ways that Levinson describes.
3. The two states that do not use the winner-take-all method are Maine and Nebraska. See 21-A Maine Rev. Stat. § 805(2); Neb. Rev. Stat. § 32-714.
4. Levinson does note in passing that the Electoral College is not solely responsible for many of the flaws he identifies (e.g., pp. 87-88 (state allocation of electors), 97
(first past the post)). But the concession is meaningless as long as he directs so much of
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That leaves two problems with the Electoral College itself
(and the back-up of a decision by the House, voting state-by-

state, if no candidate gets a majority of electors): The election of
a president who lost the popular election, and the basic unfairness of giving small states a disproportionate number of electors.
The first is indeed a flaw, but Levinson exaggerates its importance. Only four times since 1789 has the Electoral College given

the White House to a candidate who did not garner the most
popular votes-and three of those were before 1900. Moreover,
all but once the popular majority got its revenge four years later,
voting for the party (and twice the candidate himself) that had
been cheated out of the presidency by the Electoral College.6
George Bush is the only minority president to win the popular
vote the second time around. Levinson's overstated concern with
the problem of a minority'President, then, might be related to his
obvious loathing of Bush. It might be worthwhile to amend the

Constitution to eliminate the Electoral College, but one misfire
his thunder at the Electoral College. He also mentions the movement among states to
agree to allocate electors according to the popular vote (p. 97).
5. Levinson would make it five, by adopting the controversial position of a 2005
book that Nixon actually won the popular vote in 1960 (pp. 82-83, 93, relying on
GEORGE C. EDWARDS, WHY THE ELECTORAL COLLEGE IS BAD FOR AMERICA 48-51
(2005)). While that position has the advantage of making Levinson look non-partisan
(and doubling the number of Electoral College misfires in the last hundred and twenty
years), it is belied by most other sources. Even Edwards recognizes that the "traditional
count" puts Kennedy ahead by about 120,000 votes. Id. at 65. And if we're going to split
hairs, there's another factor to consider. Edwards calculates that Nixon won the popular
vote by 58,181 votes. Id. at 50. But in 1960, residents of the District of Columbia could
not vote for president (the 23rd Amendment was not ratified until 1961). In 1960, the
population of D.C. was 763,956. See http://www.infoplease.comlipa/A0922422.html. It is
likely that had they been eligible to vote, D.C. voters would have voted overwhelmingly
for Kennedy. Thus, it was the undemocratic exclusion of D.C. voters that produced Kennedy's purportedly unfair electoral victory; in a more democratic system, Kennedy would
have been the popular winner (as well as the electoral winner).
6. For a brief discussion of the four undisputed minority presidents, see, e.g.,
DANIEL A. FARBER & SUZANNA SHERRY, A HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN
CONSTITUTION 137-38 (2d ed. 2005) [hereinafter, FARBER & SHERRY, A HISTORY].
7. His hatred of Bush is palpable throughout the book. Almost all of his concrete
examples of presidential flaws center on Bush (e.g., pp. 47-48 (managing to lambaste
Bush in the course of a critique of the veto power even while acknowledging that at the
time of writing Bush had not yet vetoed a single bill); pp. 79-81 (using Bush's actions in
the War on Terror as an example of why questions surrounding the presidency are important); pp. 107-08 (citing the Bush administration's reliance on "unwritten prerogative
powers" of the executive); pp. 111-12 (using Bush's appointment of John Bolton to criticize recess appointments); p. 116 (arguing that there is "nothing academic" about the
possibility of an incompetent president, because "[e]ven if one places the war in Iraq to
one side, there is the utter failure of executive branch leadership in the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina")). In discussing the Electoral College, he invites the reader to "[r]eturn
once more, if one has the stomach for it, to the 2000 Florida election" (p. 90, emphasis
added).

144

CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY

[Vol. 25:141

in a hundred and twenty years is hardly sufficient justification for
Levinson's call to consider junking the entire structure of the
Constitution.
So what about the essential unfairness of the Electoral College? By giving each state the same number of electors as its total of Senators and Representatives, the theory goes, the Electoral College advantages small states and disadvantages large
ones. It does give small states an advantage (at least when combined with a winner-take-all allocation of electors), but does it
give disproportionate power to voters in small states? The answer, paradoxically, is that it does not. Indeed, it gives voters in
large states more power, and voters in small states less, than they
would have if we chose the president through a simple nationwide popular vote.
It is tricky to define voting "power," but the most satisfactory way to do so is to focus on the probability that an individual's vote is pivotal: that is, to ask how likely it is that the result
would change if the particular voter voted the other way. s In the
case of the winner-take-all regime under the Electoral College,
any individual's voting power is the product of the probability that
her vote would change the outcome in the state (call this P) and
the probability that a change in the state's electoral votes would
change the outcome of the election (call this S). It can be shown
mathematically that P is approximately 1/1 population of voters,
and that S is approximately equivalent to the state's voting population.9 Since states do not differ much in the ratio between total
population and voting population," we can simplify the equation

8. This the commonly accepted measure. See DAN S. FELSENTHAL & MOSHE
MACHOVER, THE MEASUREMENT OF VOTING POWER: THEORY AND PRACTICE,
PROBLEMS AND PARADOXES 196 (1998).
9. See GUILLERMO OWEN, GAME THEORY 294-303 (3d ed. 1995). For a more accessible discussion, see Paul H. Edelman, Making Votes Count in Local Elections: A
MathematicalAppraisal of At-Large Representation,4 ELECTION L.J. 258, 266-70 (2005).
10. Using data from the Census Bureau (http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/) and the
Federal Election Commission (http://www.fec.gov/pubrec/2000presgeresults.htm), one
can construct a chart comparing each state's total population to the number of people
who voted in any given election. If we do so for the 2000 election, for example, we find
that the highest percentage of the total population voted in Maine (51%) and the lowest
in Arizona (30%). The average is 39% and the standard deviation is .052 (which means
that in approximately 60% of the states, between 34% and 44% of the total population
voted (tabulated data on file with author)). EDWARDS, supra note 5, at 40, reaches a different result by calculating what percentage of each state's voting-age population actually
voted. Since electors are allocated on the basis of total population rather than on the basis of voting-age population, however, his numbers are irrelevant-which suggests that
Levinson may be too quick to rely on his data.
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by using state populations. Any individual's voting power, then,
is
PxS
or

[11/-state population ] x state population
or
the square root of the state population
Thus, the larger the population of the state, the more voting
power each of its citizens has. In short, a majority of the American public (in whom Levinson places so much trust) may be right
in failing to abolish the Electoral College.
The Constitution also creates other problems surrounding
the presidency, according to Levinson. In particular, he objects
to the lack of clear limits on presidential power, the inability to
remove a president who is incompetent but not criminal, and the
10-week delay between the election and the inauguration of a
new president. The last is essentially trivial, and Levinson devotes only 5 pages to it (pp. 98-103). The others are arguable,
but Levinson seems so blinded by his hatred of this President
that he cannot see any advantages to the current structure.
For example, most constitutional scholars recognize that it
is both impossible and unwise to delineate governmental powers
so clearly that no ambiguity remains. As John Marshall famously
reminded us, "it is a constitution we are expounding," and we
cannot expect it to be precise in providing for every eventuality."
Levinson himself notes that he is "relatively dismissive of ambiguous constitutional provisions" because they do not pose a
serious problem (p. 108). So why is he so irate about ambiguities
in executive power? Because-he says after describing the infamous John Yoo torture memo and similar arguments as "an
open invitation for those who would defend something close to
presidential dictatorship" (p. 107)-"[t]he basic problem with
the presidency is the possibility that the occupant of the White
House is too unconstrained and can all too easily engage in dramatic exertions of power, especially in the realm of foreign policy" (p. 108). It might be that he has a particularoccupant of the
White House and a particularforeign policy adventure in mind
here. 2 He also dismisses out of hand the possibility that Con11. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 407 (1819).
12. It is worth noting that Levinson's implicit criticisms of George W. Bush have
been explicitly leveled at Thomas Jefferson as well. One noted historian described Jeffer-
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gress or the courts might rein in such overzealous exercises of
executive power (pp. 107-08), essentially disregarding the
checks-and-balances theory on which the entire structure of the
Constitution is based.
Levinson presents his case for presidential removal in a section titled "On Malfeasance and Misfeasance: Why Criminal
Presidents Present Less of a Threat than 'Merely' Incompetent
Ones" (pp. 114-21). He contrasts our system with that of Great
Britain, in which an "unpopular" prime minister can be (and often
is) "unceremoniously dumped" (p. 116). In the United States,
however, we must await the next election: "A noncriminal president is thought to have an unbreakable four-year lease on the
White House.... Why in the world should 'We the People' not
be able to break the lease and evict a manifestly unsuitable or
incompetent president and replace him with someone presumably more able?" (p. 117).
Three things about this argument are worth noticing. First,
he subtly elides the differences among "incompetent," "unpopular," and "unsuitable." If he equates the three, that makes
George Bush incompetent and therefore appropriately removable. Second, the lease is almost certainly not as unbreakable as
he maintains: President Clinton was impeached not because he
committed "high crimes [or] misdemeanors" but because he was
unpopular with the party in control of the Congress. Wisely or
not, the House and Senate respectively retain the power to impeach and convict a president they find truly "unsuitable" (much
less "incompetent"), and the judiciary is unlikely to interfere."
Interim congressional elections provide a means for the electorate to reject the president's party and thus increase the chances
that Congress will at least impede his program and perhaps impeach him. Third, the Framers went round and round on this
very question, concerned that a broad power to remove a president-wherever lodged-would make the executive too dependent and thus likely to pander rather than lead. The impeachment
clause was their compromise solution.' 4 It may not be the best
son's 1807 Embargo of Great Britain (almost uniformly recognized as ineffective in accomplishing its goals and an economic disaster for the United States) as a "stubborn demand for sacrifice in a cause that millions of citizens had become sick of." Eric
McKitrick, The View from Jefferson's Camp, N.Y. REV. OF BOOKS, Dec. 17, 1970, at 35,
38.
13. See Nixon v. United States, 506 U.S. 224 (1993) (impeachment is a political
question that should not be resolved by the courts).
14. For the particular debates, see FARBER & SHERRY, A HISTORY, supra note 6, at
113-15, 125-29, 145-46.
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approach, but is it worth risking the rest of the Constitution on
the chance that we might improve on their solution?
Turning to the defects of the legislative branch, the allocation of power in the Senate need not detain us long. Levinson
points out-as many others have before him-that equal representation in the Senate "makes an absolute shambles of the idea
that in the United States the majority of the people rule" (p. 58).
Levinson is right that giving each state two Senators is neither
fair nor democratic. Few people would defend it (and I am not
one of them). 5 The real question, though, is whether this defect
warrants the calling of a convention and the potential abandonment of the entire Constitution. It rarely matters, except for the
few powers that the Senate alone wields and the exacerbation of
the ability of a minority to block legislation. The Senate is also
just the manifestation of a deeper problem that Levinson does
not address: The very existence of states as independent sovereigns is a historical accident that serves no defensible purpose
today. If we equalize representation in the Senate, why not turn
the states into administrative divisions of the national government? We are, after all, a single nation, and other nations get
along just fine without a federal structure. Levinson's solution
does not go far enough, and, as with his attacks on the executive,
one wonders whether that is because he has more of a problem
with the Senate and its Republican members (the book was written before the 2006 midterm elections) than with its structural
make-up.
Finally, Levinson objects to bicameralism and the fact that
the Constitution is nearly impossible to amend. They suffer from
essentially the same flaw, according to Levinson, which is to
make it difficult for majorities to enact their preferences into
law. Bicameralism and the presidential veto (which Levinson
characterizes as creating a tricameralist system) provide too
many "veto points" that allow representatives of a minority of
the population to block legislation (pp. 29-49). Similarly, the Article V amendment process is an "iron cage" (p. 165). He accuses
the Framers and those who support the Constitution of being
"fundamentally fearful of change and... willing to pay a high
15. Levinson in fact notes (p. 58) that I have previously attacked the allocation of
power in the Senate, in Suzanna Sherry, Our Unconstitutional Senate, in
CONSTITUTIONAL STUPIDITIES, CONSTITUTIONAL TRAGEDIES 95-97 (William N.
Eskridge, Jr. & Sanford Levinson eds., NYU Press 1998). But some scholars (even some
who live in large states) are willing to defend the Senate. See Saikrishna Prakash, More
Democracy, Less Constitution, 55 DRAKE L. REV. 899 (2007).
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price to prevent what they would deem unfortunate changes" (p.
35). Here, as elsewhere in the book, Levinson's biases are showing.
He divides the world into two types of people and asks the
reader into which category she falls:
Is it worth it, in order to deprive your opponents of the opportunity to work their political will, to make it more difficult to
pass your own favorite programs? Or, on the contrary, would
you rather have a greater likelihood of achieving your own
goals even if this means that your opponents would be more
likely to succeed if and when they are in power? (p. 38).
But both of these questions assume that you have "favorite programs." In other words, both exhibit a pro-big-government and
anti-libertarian bias. For some people, the question may not be
whether they would like to enact some program, but rather
whether as a matter of principle (and maybe pragmatism) they
believe that the government should adopt as few programs as
possible-or at least that there are not many contexts in which
government programs are likely to be an improvement on the
status quo.' 6 Levinson has no room for such people, and would
presumably lump them in with the spiteful sorts who are willing
to sacrifice their own goals just to keep their opponents from
getting anything.
This anti-libertarian bias may be somewhat hidden, but Levinson is open about his bias in favor of majoritarianism-indeed,
it is the underlying premise of the book. And casting his lot with
those who would make legislation favored by the majority easier,
even when he himself might be in dissent, is just one example.
Part of the reason he focuses on "hard-wired" defects is because
he objects to the undemocratic underpinnings of the whole Constitution: "The dreadful fact is that none of the great institutions
of American politics can plausibly claim to speak for the majority of Americans, even though all assert such claims" (p. 49). But
Levinson's majoritarianism raises two serious questions: whether
the counter-majoritarian aspects of the Constitution are necessarily flaws, and whether his proposed majoritarian cure is worse
than the disease.
On the counter-majoritarian aspects of the Constitution,
Levinson is not alone in attacking what he sees as a "democratic
16. For a principled defense of supermajority rules, see John 0. McGinnis & Michael
B. Rappaport, Our SupermajoritarianConstitution, 80 TEx. L. REv. 703 (2002).
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deficit" in our constitutional system.17 It is a truism (but true
nevertheless) that the Constitution does not establish a pure majoritarian democracy. The Bill of Rights and a few other provisions place direct limits on the power of popular majorities. Judicial review-contemplated by the Framers even if not
explicitly mentioned in the Constitution 8 - offers further protection against the tyranny of the majority. Levinson's critique of
the structure of the legislative and executive branches is just a
more interesting (but no less misguided) twist on the current
academic fervor for "popular constitutionalism": the transfer of
power from organs of government to the people themselves. 9
But does Levinson really want pure majority rule? It seems
not. He does not criticize judicial review, and he approves of
rights-based limits on government.2" And to the extent that he
approves of the power exercised by administrative agencies
(something he does not discuss), he is willing to tolerate quite
another large democratic deficit.
What he fails to recognize is that the structural provisions
he does attack are part and parcel of the same majority-limiting
system as judicial review and the Bill of Rights. The institutions
of government are structured to filter majority preferences
through more deliberative bodies, in order to preserve stability
and to, in Madison's words, "protect the people against the transient impressions into which they themselves might be led."'" Indeed, Madison and other Federalists believed that a Bill of
Rights was unnecessary because the structure of the Constitution
itself would prevent Congress from trampling individual rights.
So Levinson's argument that the Constitution gives minorities
power to influence (and occasionally block) legislation favored
by the majority is exactly the point.

17. See Sanford Levinson, How the United States Constitution Contributes to the
DemocraticDeficit in America, 55 DRAKE L. REV. 859 (2007).
18. See, e.g., Suzanna Sherry, The Founders' Unwritten Constitution, 54 U. CHI. L.
REV. 1127 (1987).
19. For a description and a critique of popular constitutionalism, see DANIEL A.
FARBER & SUZANNA

SHERRY, JUDGMENT CALLS: PRINCIPLE AND

POLITICS IN

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (2008). In its most common form, popular constitutionalism is an
attack on the Supreme Court and judicial review.
20. On rights, see, e.g., pp. 5, 175; on judicial review, see Prakash, supra note 15, at
912 ("Professor Levinson's notable failure to call for the elimination of judicial review
suggests that he has a rather large soft spot for at least one extremely undemocratic veto
point").
21. JAMES MADISON, NOTES OF DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787,
at 193 (Tues. June 26, 1787) (Ohio University Press 1966).
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Leaving aside the inconsistency in Levinson's approach to
various undemocratic aspects of the Constitution, he and I part
company primarily in how much (or how little) faith we place in
government by referendum. The unwavering faith in the wisdom
of popular majorities that underlies his attack on the Constitution also gives rise to his proposed solution to the democracy
deficit: a constitutional convention and a national referendum to
ratify the convention's handiwork. I turn, then, to that solution.
In proposing a constitutional convention, Levinson is aware
that it would be essentially uncontrollable and could revise any
or all of the Constitution. As he says, many friends with whom
he has discussed his proposal, especially liberals, "envision a
runaway convention that would tear up the most admirable parts
of the Constitution" (p. 174). His response is to assert his faith in
the American people:
I continue to have sufficient faith in the democratic ideal that
I believe that most of the public, in a truly serious debate
about the Constitution, could be persuaded to support the essential rights that are required for membership in a republican
political order (p. 175).
He provides no evidence for this assertion, of course. And immediately after making it, he backtracks. He notes that the fears
of his liberal friends are not totally unwarranted, "unhappily acknowledg[ing] that they are drawn from the experiences of the
twentieth century and the potential for disaster in certain kinds
of pseudodemocratic, demagogic politics from which the United
States is certainly not immune" (p. 175). He agrees that "many
recent proposals for new amendments are absurd or pernicious"
(p. 176). His response to the latter problem, that we should attack those proposals "while at the same time proposing other, far
more desirable changes" (p. 176), misses two points. First, he is
not simply proposing new amendments, but a constitutional convention-and once we have a second convention, it becomes
more likely that we will have a third, a fourth, and so on, undermining the stability that has been a hallmark of American government. Second, the proposed amendments are not only pernicious in themselves, they are illustrative of the type of proposals
that might come out of a constitutional convention.
And it is not just proposed amendments that should give us
pause. As many scholars have shown, the success of direct de-
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mocracy at the state level has been mixed at best.22 In particular-and as one might expect-state constitutional amendments
adopted by referendum have been especially intolerant of minority rights. 23 Two common examples are amendments prohibiting gay marriage and amendments prohibiting affirmative action.' Both might well end up in any document produced by a
constitutional convention. Imposing super-majority requirements (especially for legislation that would raise taxes) is another popular subject for direct democracy, which runs directly
contrary to Levinson's critique of "veto points."
Polls are also a predictor of the likely results of a constitutional convention, and they are not encouraging. Polls consistently show that a majority of Americans oppose the constitu22. See, e.g., RICHARD J. ELLIS, DEMOCRATIC DELUSIONS: THE INITIATIVE
PROCESS IN AMERICA (2002); DAVID S. BRODER, DEMOCRACY DERAILED: INITIATIVE
CAMPAIGNS AND THE POWER OF MONEY (2000); THOMAS E. CRONIN, DIRECT
DEMOCRACY: THE POLITICS OF INITIATIVE, REFERENDUM, AND RECALL (1989); Erwin
Chemerinsky, Challenging Direct Democracy, 2007 MICH. ST. L. REV. 293 (2007); Ethan
J. Lieb, Can Direct Democracy Be Made Deliberative?, 54 BUFF. L. REV. 903 (2006);
Glen Staszewski, The Bait-and-Switch in Direct Democracy, 2006 WiSC. L. REV. 17; Cody
Hoesly, Reforming Direct Democracy: Lessons from Oregon, 93 CAL. L. REV. 1191
(2005); Thad Kousser & Mathew D. McCubbins, Social Choice, Crypto-Initiatives, and
Policymaking by Direct Democracy, 78 S. CAL. L. REV. 949 (2005); Sherman J. Clark,
The Characterof Direct Democracy, 13 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 341 (2004); Elizabeth
Garrett, Money, Agenda-Setting, and Direct Democracy, 77 TEX. L. REV. 1845 (1999);
Sherman J. Clark, A Populist Critique of Direct Democracy, 112 HARV. L. REV. 434
(1998); Elizabeth Garrett, Who Directs Direct Democracy?, 4 U. CHI. L. SCH. ROUNDTABLE
17 (1997); Julian Eule, Judicial Review of Direct Democracy, 99 YALE L.J. 1503 (1990);
Cynthia L. Fountaine, Lousy Lawmaking: Questioning the Desirabilityand Constitutionality of Legislating by Initiative, 61 S. CAL. L. REV. 733 (1988).
23. See, e.g., ANTI-GAY RIGHTS: ASSESSING VOTER INITIATIVES (Stephanie L.
Witt & Suzanne McCorkle eds., 1997); John C. Brittain, Direct Democracy by the Majority Can Jeopardize the Civil Rights of Minority or Other Powerless Groups, 1996 ANN.
SURV. AM. L. 441 (1996).
24. Between 1998 and 2007, voters in half the states approved constitutional
amendments prohibiting gay marriage. In at least 8 of the 25, the amendment originated
with We the People rather than with the legislature. See Alabama Const. Art. I, § 36.03
(approved 2006); Alaska Const. Art. 1, § 25 (approved 1998); Arkansas Const. Amend.
83, § 1 (approved 2004) (initiative); Colorado Const. Art. 2, § 31 (approved 2006) (initiative) Georgia Const. Art. 1, § 4, I (approved 2004); Idaho Const. § 28 (approved 2006);
Kentucky Const. § 233A (approved 2004); Louisiana Const. Art. 12, § 15 (approved
2004); Michigan Const. Art. 1, § 25 (approved 2004) (initiative); Mississippi Const. Art.
14, § 263A (approved 2004); Missouri Const. Art. 1, § 33 (approved 2004); Montana
Const. Art. XIII, § 7 (approved 2004) (initiative); Nebraska Const. Art. I, § 29 (approved
2000) (initiative); Nevada Const. Art. 1, § 21 (approved 2002) (initiative); North Dakota
Const. Art. 11, § 28 (approved 2004); Ohio Const. Art. XV, § 11 (approved 2004) (initiative); Oklahoma Const. Art. 2, § 35 (approved 2004); Oregon Const. Art. XV, § 5a (approved 2004) (initiative); South Carolina Const. Art. XVII, § 15 (approved 2006); South
Dakota Const. Art. 21, § 9 (approved 2006); Tennessee Const. Art. 11, § 18 (approved
2006); Texas Const. Art. 1, § 32 (approved 2005); Utah Const. Art. 1, § 29 (approved
2004); Virginia Const. Art. 1, § 15-A (approved 2006); Wisconsin Const. Art. 13, § 13
(approved 2006).

152

CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY

[Vol. 25:141

tional ban on school prayer," believe the United States is a
Christian nation,26 and do not believe in evolution 27-so the Establishment Clause might be in serious jeopardy under Levinson's proposal. One 2007 poll found that only 60% of Americans
agree with the statement "Newspapers should be allowed to
freely criticize the U.S. military about its strategy and performance." (Maybe Levinson finds it more comforting than I do that
a bare majority of the American public seems to support the
core of the First Amendment's free-speech protections.)
I find these snapshots of the American public disturbing,
and enough to make me afraid of a constitutional convention.
Levinson, I am sure, would accuse me of being Madisonian or
Hamiltonian. He describes "most liberals" as "fully Madisonian
in being close to terrified of the passions of their fellow citizens"
(p. 174), and calls views like mine a "fear of the uncaged beast of
American democracy-a view identified more with the quasimonarchical Hamilton than with the unabashedly democratic
Jefferson" (p. 176). And indeed, Levinson acknowledges his own
"deep Jeffersonian roots" (p. 225), opening the book with a long
quotation from Jefferson and closing it with a paean to his hero:
If a critical mass does indeed agree that our Constitution is seriously defective, then a campaign would have the potential to
capture national attention and forge a new consciousness....
Thomas Jefferson would yet live. Who knows where the spirit
of critical reflection might lead? Perhaps it would contribute

25. See First Amendment Center, State of the First Amendment 2007: Final Annotated Survey, http://www.firstamendmentcenter.org/pdf/SOFA2007results.pdf
("First
Amendment Center Poll") (Question 25) (Percentage of Americans agreeing with the
statement "Teachers and other public school officials should be allowed to lead prayers
in public school": 57% (1997), 65% (1999), 65% (2000), 52% (2005), 58% (2007)). See
also id. (Question 34) (50% of Americans agree, 47% disagree, with statement "A public
school teacher should be allowed to use the Bible as a factual text in a history or social
studies class"). This poll, which is also cited in notes 26 & 28, also asked about political
affiliation, and 30% of respondents said they were Democrats, 28% said they were Republicans, and 26% said they were Independents. Id. (Question 49).
26. See Pew Forum Surveys: Many Americans With Mix of Religion and Politics,
http://pewforum.orgldocs/index.php?DocID=153 ("Pew poll") (Percentage responding
"yes" to the question "Is the U.S. a Christian Nation": 60% (1996), 67% (2002), 71%
(2005), 67% (2006)). See also First Amendment Center Poll, supra note 25 (Question 27)
(55% of Americans support the statement "The U.S. Constitution establishes a Christian
nation.")
27. See Pew Poll, supra note 26 (only 26% of Americans believe in evolution
through natural selection); see also CBSNews.com, Polk Majority Reject Evolution,
http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2005/10/22/opinionpolls/main965223.shtml
("51% of
Americans say God created humans in their present form, and another three in 10 say
that while humans evolved, God guided the process").
28. See First Amendment Center Poll, supra note 25 (Question 15).
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to the reinvigoration of the American experiment in government by the people and the construction of a constitution better fitted to meet the demands of our twenty-first-century society (p. 180).
So it comes down to this: Are we better off following the
political philosophy of Hamilton (and the early Madison) or that
of Jefferson? A full-blown comparison is beyond the scope of a
book review, but here are just a few data points: Jefferson's
blind adulation of democracy led him to support the French
Revolution (which quickly degenerated into the worst kind of
tyranny) while Hamilton was an early and famously fiery opponent. 9 Hamilton was a self-made man, rising from an ignoble
birth to high office through talent and hard work. 0 For all his
democratic oratory, Jefferson was an aristocrat and a petty tyrant, selling his slaves to satisfy his own debts and freeing only
five of them (out of more than a hundred) in his will.3" Jefferson's view of Hamilton illustrates this difference between them:
One of Jefferson's sympathetic biographers describes him as
having "all the scorn of a Virginian, of the old stock, for the immigrant of doubtful birth, who was almost an alien. 3 2 As the
first Secretary of the Treasury, the commercially minded Hamilton took the new nation's weak, debt-ridden economy and put it
on a stable footing.33 The romantic agrarian Jefferson, by contrast, ran his own estate into the ground and nearly did the same
to the national economy.34 Jefferson was as ardent a defender of
See, e.g., RON CHERNOW, ALEXANDER HAMILTON 316-17,429-37,459 (2004).
See id. at 7-82.
31. See, e.g., DARREN STALOFF, HAMILTON, ADAMS, JEFFERSON: THE POLITICS
OF ENLIGHTENMENT AND THE AMERICAN FOUNDING 237-40 (2005) (Jefferson as aristocrat); STANLEY ELKINS & ERIC MCKITRICK, THE AGE OF FEDERALISM 201-04 (1993)
(same); JOSEPH J. ELLIS, AMERICAN SPHINX: THE CHARACTER OF THOMAS JEFFERSON
147-49 (sale of slaves), 288-90 (failure to free most slaves at his death) (1997); Paul
Finkelman, Jefferson and Slavery: "Treason Against the Hopes of the World," in
JEFFERSONIAN LEGACIES 181 (Peter S. Onuf ed., 1993) (same).
32. GILBERT CHINARD, THOMAS JEFFERSON: THE APOSTLE OF AMERICANISM
270 (1929).
33. See, e.g., David McGowan, Ethos in Law and History: Alexander Hamilton, The
Federalist, and the Supreme Court, 85 MINN. L. REv. 755, 794-804 (2001). See also
STALOFF, supra note 31, at 91 (calling Hamilton's financial reports "among the most brilliant government reports in American history").
34. On Jefferson's private descent into bankruptcy, see, e.g., Herbert E. Sloan,
PRINCIPLE AND INTEREST: THOMAS JEFFERSON AND THE PROBLEM OF DEBT (1995).
On Jefferson's ruin of the national economy, see, e.g., STALOFF, supra note 31, at 346-47;
see also id. at 359-60 (Jefferson's "agrarian idyll threw a web of Romantic rhetoric over
the underdeveloped and crude character of southern rural society"); Gordon S. Wood,
The Trials and Tribulations of Thomas Jefferson, in JEFFERSONIAN LEGACIES 395, 411
(Peter S. Onuf ed., 1993) ("He did indeed want comforts and prosperity for his American
farmers, but like some modern liberals he had little or no appreciation of the economic
29.

30.
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states rights as Hamilton was a nationalist-and it is therefore
somewhat ironic that Levinson would excise from the Constitution some of its most state-friendly components.
In short, Jefferson was a visionary; Hamilton was a realist.
As one scholar puts it:
[I]t was Alexander Hamilton who made the twentieth century
"the American century."

. .

. [T]he foundation of America's

superpower status was laid in the early days of the republic,
when Alexander Hamilton, who had a vision of American
greatness, battled with forces fearful of concentrated political,
economic, and military power necessary to achieve greatness.... Jefferson was the poet of the American founding,
while Hamilton was the nation builder who infused the essential elements of permanence and stability in the American system."
Jeffersonian utopianism may be fine as an aspiration, but when it
comes to a functioning government, Hamilton beats him hands
down.
Americans are periodically infatuated with Thomas Jefferson and his vision of an idyllic democratic republic of yeomanfarmer statesmen. Legal scholars passed through what Joseph
Ellis calls a "Jeffersonian Surge"36 in the 1980s, focusing on the
Jeffersonian idea of civic republicanism. Levinson's attachment
to Jefferson is apparently more enduring, and Our Undemocratic
Constitution is an odd amalgam of that earlier era and today's
scholarship on popular constitutionalism, producing a proposal
that is as unabashedly optimistic as Jefferson himself was.
And yet, in the end, I can't help but wonder whether Levinson is more Hamiltonian than he lets on. In mid-June 1787, the
Constitutional Convention in Philadelphia was deep into its
comparison between the Randolph proposal to write a new,
forces that made such prosperity and comforts possible").
35. Stephen Knott, "Opposed in Death as in Life": Hamilton and Jefferson in
American Memory, in THE MANY FACES OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON: THE LIFE AND
LEGACY OF AMERICA'S MOST ELUSIVE FOUNDING FATHER 25-26 (Douglas Ambrose
& Robert W.T. Martin eds., 2006).
36. ELLIS, supra note 31, at 14.
37. For a survey of legal scholarship on civic republicanism (and its critics), see
Suzanna Sherry, Responsible Republicanism: Educating for Citizenship, 62 U. CHI. L.
REV. 131, 133-45 (1995). As is typical of legal scholars, they were twenty years behind
historians, whose veneration of Jefferson had been declining since the 1970s. See ELLIS,
supra note 31, at 16-19. I must admit that I was an active contributor to the civic republican literature, but I hope my work was tempered with realism.
38. On Jefferson's optimism, see CHERNOW, supra note 29, at 316-18; Wood, supra
note 34, at 413.
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more nationalist constitution (strongly supported by Madison)
and the cautious, less nationalist New Jersey proposal to merely
amend the Articles of Confederation. On June 18, Hamilton
took the floor and spoke for hours-his remarks run more than
10 pages in Madison's Notes and are the only entry for that day. 39
He "declare[d] himself unfriendly to both plans," and proposed
a breathtakingly radical substitute that included abolishing the
states altogether, establishing an equivalent to the British House
of Lords, and letting the executive serve for life as "an elective
Monarch.""0 Given that such a plan had no chance of succeeding,
one might speculate that Hamilton's speech was a tactical attempt to make the Randolph plan look moderate. If so, it succeeded: The next day, Madison himself gave an impassioned
speech in favor of Randolph's proposal and the Convention
voted seven states to three (with one state divided) to reject the
New Jersey plan.4
If Levinson hopes his radical call to arms will result in a few
much-needed (and less radical) amendments, I applaud him. But
if he truly believes that we should call a second constitutional
convention, he ought to heed Charles Pinckney's warning at the
end of the first one: "Nothing but confusion and contrariety
could spring from the experiment.... Conventions are serious
things, and ought not to be repeated. '42

39.
40.
41.
42.

MADISON, supra note 21, at 129-39 (Monday June 18, 1787).

Id. at 129 ("unfriendly"), 136 ("elective Monarch").
Id. at 140-48 (Tuesday June 19, 1787).
Id. at 651 (Saturday September 15, 1787).

